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Claire Mummé*

Unifying the Field: Mapping the Relationship
Between Work Law Regimes in Ontario, Then
and Now

Since the mid-20th century in Canada, labour and employment law have been treated
as two separate but related fields. In 1981 Brian Langille argued in “Labour Law is a
Subset of Employment Law” for the unification of the fields, so that all forms of waged
work were understood as matters of public policy, rather than leaving some types of
work to private law regulation. Taking up Langille’s argument, this paper argues that
employment contracts, individual and collective, are structured through the overlap,
interaction and gaps between work law regimes. The creation of a unified field moves
from studying the regimes in isolation to studying the relationship between them,
particularly the common law, labour law and minimum standards legislation. Adopting
such a focus leads us backward to retell the historical story of the relationship between
the regimes in the mid-20th century. It also points us forward towards new questions
about how the regimes interact to structure employment contracts, and how their gaps
and interactions are acting to build and sustain inequalities in the context of changing
forms of work.
Depuis le milieu du XXe siècle au Canada, le droit du travail et le droit de l’emploi
sont traités comme deux domaines distincts mais liés. En 1981, Brian Langille a
plaidé dans « Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law » pour l’unification des
deux domaines, afin que toutes les formes de travail salarié soient comprises comme
des questions d’intérêt public, plutôt que de laisser certains types de travail à la
réglementation du droit privé. Reprenant l’argument de Langille, nous soutenons dans
le présent article que les contrats de travail, individuels et collectifs, sont structurés par
le chevauchement, l’interaction et les lacunes entre les régimes de droit du travail. La
création d’un domaine unifié permet de passer de l’étude isolée des régimes à l’étude
des relations entre eux, en particulier la common law, le droit du travail et la législation
sur les normes minimales. L’adoption d’une telle approche nous amène à revenir en
arrière pour raconter l’histoire des relations entre les régimes au milieu du XXe siècle.
Cela nous amène également à nous poser de nouvelles questions sur la manière dont
les régimes interagissent pour structurer les contrats de travail, et sur la manière dont
leurs lacunes et leurs interactions contribuent à créer et à maintenir des inégalités dans
le contexte de l’évolution des formes de travail.
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Introduction
Several different legal regimes regulate waged employment in Canada,
most notably the common law of employment, statutory labour law,
and minimum standards legislation.1 In Canada, these three regimes are
typically apportioned between two separate, if related fields. One field
is labour law, which regulates unionized employment through labour
relations statutes and arbitral case law. The second field is employment
law, which regulates individual non-unionized work through the common
law and minimum employment standards statutes.
The conceptual division between the fields of labour and employment
law first emerged in the mid-20th century Fordist era.2 The common law
of employment contracts had loosely regulated the work of high-status
1.
Minimum standards statutes include all statutes that impose a floor of rights into the employment
contract. Under this rubric typically falls provincial employment standards acts (ESAs), human rights
codes (HRCs) and occupational health and safety statutes (OHSAs). Although all three create a floor
of rights, they do so in different ways. For the most part the ESAs provide material entitlements—
they primarily set out what the parties must give each other. The HRCs, by contrast, mostly impose
behavioural obligations—they set out what parties may and may not do towards one another. OHSAs
are composed of both types of standards but lean more towards behavioural obligations.
2.
See Michael Piore & Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity
(New York: Basic Books, 1984) at 19-20. Piore and Sabel define Fordism, or mass production, as the
substitution of skilled labour for highly specialized machinery operated by semi-skilled workers on
assembly lines, capable of producing large quantities of goods. Liepetz argues that Fordism can be
analyzed along three vectors: first as creating an industrial paradigm built around Taylorist methods of
production; second as a macroeconomic structure designed, amongst other things, to extend workers’
purchasing power, and third as a “system of rules (or mode of regulation) [that] implied a long-term
contractualization of the wage relationship, with rigid controls over redundancy, and a monitored
increase in salaries indexed to prices and general productivity,” combined with the creation of a
welfare state. See Alain Liepitz, “The Post-Fordist World: Labour Relations, International Hierarchy
and Global Ecology” (Annual lecture of the Review of International Political Economy, Durham, 7
November 1995) published in (1997) 4:1 Rev Intl Political Economy 1.
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professional employees since the turn of the 20th century.3 A new system
of labour law was enacted in the aftermath of the Second World War,
representing a grand bargain between labour, capital and the state. This
new system was to introduce democracy into the blue-collar workplaces of
the country.4 It was labour law, therefore, that was the focus of academics,
lawyers, and government policymakers. A body of minimum standards
legislation also existed by the mid-century. It initially emerged in the early
20th century to regulate the work of women and children but was slowly
expanded in content and extended to all genders as of the mid-century.
Although minimum standards legislation applied to both unionized
and non-unionized work, it was placed under the aegis of employment
law, where the common law of employment already resided. The field
of employment law thereafter held a dual role, regulating both the work
of higher-income employees through the common law and the growing
numbers of precariously employed workers through minimum standards
legislation.
In the early 1980s scholars like Innis Christie and Brian Langille
began to speak about a field of “employment law” as distinct from labour
law. Employment law was defined in opposition to labour law—as
comprising all the law that did not regulate unionized workers: the law
of the unorganized.5 Langille explained that employment law consisted
of “the sum of the archaic common law under the odious rubric of the
‘the law of master and servant,’ which consist[ed] of assorted relics of a
dead social order, along with a number of statutes of more or less modern
vintage dealing with topics such as a minimum wage.”6 Still, because of its
gender-based origins, the statutory laws of non-unionized work remained
peripheral to policy and academic discussion until the turn of the 21st
century, treated, in the famous words of Judy Fudge, as “labour law’s little
sister.”7 Over the last decades, employment law and precarious work have
3.
I say “loosely” because, in Ontario at least, only a few employment contracts claims were
litigated until the 1960s. To what extent the common law of employment’s principles helped structure
employment relationships during this period is unknown. See Claire Mummé, “That Indispensable
Figment of the Legal Mind”: The Contract of Employment at Common Law in Ontario, 1890–1979
(PhD dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School at York University, 2013) [unpublished].
4.
Harry W Arthurs, “Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada’s Second
Century” (1967) 45:4 Can Bar Rev 786.
5.
Christie notes that defining employment law in opposition to union status was somewhat
arbitrary: Innis Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworth & Co, 1980) at 1; Brian
Langille, “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (1981) 31 UTLJ 200 at 200 [Langille,
“Subset”].
6.
Langille, “Subset,” supra note 5 at 200, drawing on the language of Roger Rideout, Principles
of Labour Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1979) at 3.
7.
Judy Fudge, “Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law’s Little Sister and
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taken on greater policy and academic significance, thanks to the efforts
of key academic and activist leaders, but precarious workers continue to
enjoy lesser rights than other employees.
In 1981 Brian Langille argued that labour lawyers should expand
their field of vision beyond the law of unionized work to include the legal
regulation of non-unionized employees. He famously declared that “labour
law is a subset of employment law” in an eponymous paper.8 Langille’s
idea can be interpreted in different ways. One reading of “Subset” suggests
that individual rights ought to take primacy over collective rights; that
employment law is the central phenomenon and labour law simply one of its
animating parts. But one can also read “Subset” as arguing for the creation
of a single field that studies the regulation of all types of waged work
relationships—for the abandonment of any hierarchy amongst work law
regimes.9 Langille makes both arguments at different points in “Subset,”
but this paper focuses on the second interpretation.10 In “Subset” Langille
emphasized that bifurcating the field between labour and employment law
had important policy implications. Most notably, the separation served
to relegate non-unionized work into the private law sphere of contracts,
formal legal equality and self-regulation, cloaking the socioeconomic
power differential between parties and impeding the development of strong
statutory protections for non-unionized workers. Langille therefore argued
that the laws regulating both types of work should be considered through
a unified lens—that they should form a single legal field concerned with
regulating waged employment, all of which was to be a matter of public
policy.
David Doorey recently took up Langille’s challenge and devised an
analytical framework that examines the overall operation of the laws of
work in Canada.11 This paper also follows Langille’s directive but takes
the Feminization of Labour” (1991) 7 JL & Soc Pol’y 73. In Ontario precarious employment began
receiving policy attention as a result of the efforts of dedicated activists and scholars, such as Mary
Gellatly, Deena Ladd, Judy Fudge and Leah Vosko, amongst others.
8.
Langille, “Subset,” supra note 5.
9.
“Subset” can be read as putting forward different arguments in part because it uses “employment
law” to refer both to the specific law of non-unionized employment and to the general law of waged
work (ibid). Langille explains the field of employment law as consisting of the law of the unorganized,
including the common law and employment-related statutes. But in other places, he describes
employment law as “the area of law aimed at securing justice in the employment relationship” (ibid at
201). Here he does not refer to specific legal mechanisms for doing so, but rather defines “employment
law” as all law designed to achieve this specific goal. Finally, Langille argues for a unified field of
study and regulation. It follows that maintaining a hierarchy of regimes but swapping one for the other
does not meet his stated goal of creating a broad lens of inquiry.
10. Ibid at 230.
11. David J Doorey, The Law of Work: Complete Edition (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2020) at
20-30.
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a slightly different approach. This paper argues that at the core of any
unified field is an understanding of the relationship between work law
regimes.12 Focusing on the relationship between the regimes leads us
backwards to a retelling of the history of Fordist work law regulation—
one that covers a broader swath of the population than unionized work. It
also points us towards new questions about how their current interactions
operate to segment the labour force, questions we need answered so that
we can properly understand how inequalities are being built into the labour
market in the context of changing forms of work.
In brief, a study of the relationship between regimes offers the
following story. In the post-war era, the legal regulation of waged
employment in Canada was primarily structured around three legal
regimes: the common law, labour law, and a growing body of minimum
standards legislation. These regimes were organized into a hierarchical
pyramid. A single regime sat at each level of the pyramid, which played
the primary role in regulating designated occupations. Those occupations
then roughly correlated with particular classes, gender and races of
workers. The common law of employment was at the top layer, labour
law was in the middle, and minimum standards law was at the bottom
of the pyramid. But the regimes also interacted between levels, as the
content of their rights were often devised in reaction, comparison and
rejection of the others. At the centre of the pyramid was labour law and
unionized white, male, blue-collar workers employed in what is known
as the Standard Employment Relationship (SER).13 Through the family
wage, further explained below, unionized work was intended to provide
for all but the highest and lowest status workers. In practice, however, a
significant number of workers did not receive the benefits of the SER and
were pushed into work at the bottom of the pyramid. The Fordist era came
to an end in the 1980s, as production methods, political ideologies and
law were restructured in transnational and deregulatory ways. Since that
time more and more workers have been employed in precarious positions,
while unionized work has declined and labour law has decreased in
regulatory significance, particularly in the private sector. The majority of
the Canadian workforce is now non-unionized and regulated by a mix of
the common law and minimum standards legislation. The question is how
these two legal regimes, one built for the most powerful workers and the
12. This paper forms an early part of a larger research project currently in design that explores the
history and current operation of the relationships between work law regimes in Canada. That project
investigates work law across Canadian jurisdictions and includes human rights and occupational
health laws, as well as the regimes discussed in this paper.
13. See infra, n 49 for a definition of the SER.
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other for the least, are interacting to structure post-Fordist employment
contracts and the labour market.
The rest of the paper fleshes out this story and is structured as follows.
Section I examines the meaning and consequences of the separation of
labour and employment law in Canada. Section II offers a simplified
retelling (as much as can be accomplished in a paper of this size) of the
relationship between work law regimes in mid-20th century Canada when
they took on their current configuration. Section III then examines what
has happened to the operation of the mid-20th century work law pyramid
in the post-Fordist era specifically in Ontario, faced with changing forms
of work and demographic transformations. Section IV places all three
Ontario regimes on one canvass and identifies the holes in our current
knowledge about how the regimes are interacting to structure individual
employment contracts. The paper ends with some thoughts on the overall
functioning of work law in Ontario.
I. The current contours of “labour” and “employment” law in Canada
As noted above, labour law refers to the law relating to unionization,
collective bargaining, industrial disputes, and to the day to day
administration of the unionized workplace. In each Canadian jurisdiction,
labour law is comprised of a labour relations statute regulating private
sector employment, several public sector labour statutes, and labour
arbitration case law.14 Labour law is conceptually based on the power of
collective action. It modifies general common law principles of contract
and property to allow workers15 to aggregate their bargaining power so that
they can negotiate together on a more equal footing with their employer,
who otherwise enjoys greater economic, social, and bureaucratic power.
14. See eg, the coverage of Donald Carter, Geoffrey England, Brian Etherington & Gilles Trudeau,
Labour Law in Canada (Markham: Butterworths Canada 2002) updated online through LabourSource
in WestlawNext; George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd Ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019)
updated online through WestlawNext’s LabourSource. Arbitral case law is a body of law developed
by labour arbitrators with exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of collective
agreements. See Donald Brown & David Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 5th ed (Aurora:
Canada Law Book, 2019) available online through LabourSource in WestlawNext.
15. In this paper I use the terms “worker” and “employee” interchangeably. The concept of a
“worker” has no legal meaning in Canada. Rather, Canadian work law regimes tend to distinguish
between “employees” to whom the regimes apply, and “independent contractors,” who are
independent businesspeople and thought not to be in need of additional legal protections than that
offered by the common law. Most work law regimes have designated an intermediate status of
“dependent contractors,” who are treated as employees for the purpose of that law. As noted, in this
paper I used the concepts of “worker” and “employee” interchangeably except in instances where the
legal classification of employment status is relevant. Note, however, that in some jurisdictions the
concept of a “worker” does have legal meaning because it refers to intermediate employment status
between “independent contractor” and “employee.” For a history of this category in the UK, see
Douglas Brodie, “Employees, Workers and the Self-Employed” (2005) 34:3 Indus LJ 253.
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Labour law is procedural, rather than substantive, because it changes the
common law process of bargaining, but leaves the parties to decide the
actual terms of their agreement.16 Minimum standards statutes, which
provide a floor of rights and obligations beneath which unions and
employers may not contract, also apply to unionized work. But because
they are premised on individual rather than collective rights, the minimum
standards statutes are not typically placed at the core of labour law—they
are viewed as practically significant but conceptually peripheral to labour
law. 17
Instead, minimum standards legislation is typically considered within
the framework of employment law and the regulation of non-unionized
work. Employment law is composed of the common law of employment
and employment-related statutes, particularly employment standards and
human rights law. The work relationships of non-unionized workers are
conceptualized through a common law framework that understands the
relationship as a contract between two individual parties. This framework is
operationalized by background rules from the general law of contract, and
a set of implied duties that give substantive shape to the relationship. The
common law implied duties impose a series of behavioural obligations as
contractual terms, primarily on employees, such as the duty of obedience,
fidelity, loyalty, good faith, confidentiality, etc.18 These terms are implied
by law because they are said to arise from the nature of the employment
relationship itself.19 These behavioural obligations, in turn, create the
normative foundation of the employment relationship and actuate the
16. According to Langille, there are two regulatory methods to address the inequality of power
between employers and employees. The first is a procedural approach, where workers have access
to a legal process through which to aggregate their bargaining power, so as to bargain on a more
equal footing with their employers. This is the approach of Canadian labour law, which imposes an
obligation to bargain in good faith but does not impose the terms that must be included in the collective
agreement. The second approach is to legislate employment contract terms. This is the approach of
the minimum standards statutes, which read in terms that must be in employment contracts unless
the parties agree to provide more than the minimum statutory standard. See Brian Langille, “Labour
Law’s Back Pages” in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006).
17. Human rights law is, in particular, recognized as having a large impact on labour-management
relations and as being a core part of labour lawyers’ jobs. But it is not viewed as founded in the logic
of labour law, because of its individual orientation.
18. Hugh Collins, “Implied Terms in the Contract of Employment” in Mark Freedland et al, eds,
The Contract of Employment (Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 22. The obligation to provide
reasonable notice of dismissal absent cause is the primary implied duty held by employers—see Carter
v Bell and Sons Ltd, [1936] OR 290, 2 DLR 438 (CA), which is more substantive than procedural.
Employers are also subject to the implied duty to dismiss in a good faith manner—see Wallace v
United Grain Growers Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 701, 152 DLR (4th) 1, and to perform their contracts in an
honest manner—see Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71.
19. Machtinger v Hoj Industries [1992] 1 SCR 986, 91 DLR (4th) 491.
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employer’s managerial prerogative, a residual right of control over the
day-to-day management of the workplace. The material terms of the
contract, the wages, hours of work, etc, are then added into this framework
to complete the contract of employment. Beyond the implied terms,
the common law does not itself mandate the inclusion of any material
terms in employment contracts. These terms thus originate from party
negotiations, from employer imposition, and/or from applicable minimum
standards legislation. The expression, “the common law of employment,”
is often used as a shorthand reference not only for the background rules
and substantive doctrines of the common law of employment but also to
terms negotiated between the parties/imposed by the employer, so as to
differentiate them from those imposed by statute. As a theoretically private
relationship, monitoring the day-to-day administration of the employment
contract is left to the parties. Employers have a series of self-help remedies
available for employee breach, such as corrective discipline measures
and termination. In practice, employees can remedy a breach only after
relationship breakdown.20
The separation of labour and employment law in Canada is procedural
as well as conceptual. The rights of unionized workers are interpreted
and applied by specialized labour boards and labour arbitrators, the latter
of which operate as a one-stop-shop for issues relating to collective
agreements and all employment-related statutes.21 By contrast, the rights
of non-unionized employees are interpreted and applied by the common
law courts and a large array of administrative decision-makers, such as
the ministries of labour for employment standards, human rights tribunals
for human rights law, safety inspectors and labour boards for occupational
health and safety, etc.
But of course, the two fields do not actually operate in strict parallel.
Individual minimum standards statutes apply to both unionized and nonunionized workers, and some, like employment standards and human rights
20. Because of the imbalance of bargaining power between the parties, employees often fear raising
issues while on the job, less they be dismissed for it. In addition, in Suleman v British Columbia
Research Council, [1990] BCJ No 2707, 52 BCLR (2d) 138 [Suleman] the BCCA held that an
employee repudiates their employment contract if they commence a lawsuit against their employer
while in employment. The Supreme Court declined to speak on the issue in Potter v New Brunswick
Legal Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10 at para 181.
21. Labour arbitrators have the authority to interpret and apply all employment-related statutes—
see Parry Sound (District) Welfare Administration Board v Ontario Public Service Employees Union
Local 324, 2003 SCC 42. In some cases, arbitrators will in fact have exclusive jurisdiction to apply the
statutes in unionized workplaces—see Weber v Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929, 125 DLR (4th) 583.
But in some other cases, such as with human rights law, labour arbitrators hold concurrent jurisdiction
with human rights tribunals: see Tranchemontagne v Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program),
2006 SCC 14.
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law, have become quite central to the regulation of unionized employment.
Moreover, as members of the field well know, workers do not experience
work law regimes in silos, or as neatly separated legal regimes. Workers
and employers experience the laws of work as a jumble of overlapping
and fragmented legal regimes. The practice of separating the fields assists
policy discussions and legal analysis but does not represent the reality
experienced in practice, where one rarely encounters an employment
relationship structured by a single regime. As David Doorey argues, we
have divided the fields to be able to manage the complexity of the interaction
amongst the regimes but doing so “oversimplifies the complexity of the
legal framework that governs the employment relationship in Canada. A
closer inspection shows a far more complicated terrain, one that cannot be
so neatly compartmentalized.”22 In other words, the compartmentalization
allows us to put some order in chaos. But it does not permit for a detailed
and nuanced analysis of the actual operation of different types of work
relationships or a picture of the entire system of work law regulation in
Canada.
The idea of unifying work law fields has been in debate amongst
labour lawyers in a few different contexts. In the United Kingdom, for
instance, there has been a move to reframe the law of unionized work
as based on an individual rights framework—to integrate individual
rights concepts into collective labour law.23 The idea of broadening the
field also plays a key role in the “law of the labour market” approach
advocated by some scholars, which seeks to expand the field of labour
law to include all laws that structure the supply and demand for labour.24
The proposal in this paper differs significantly from both. It does not seek
to merge individual rights into a collective rights framework, nor does it
understand waged work as a market organized primarily around supply
and demand. Rather this paper offers a normative pitch for a descriptive
framework that focuses on the relationship between work law regimes
in Canada to better understand and assess how they interact to structure
individual employment contracts. It argues that identifying the spaces of
their imbrication, overlap, contradiction and gap will further our ability to
address the pressing issues faced by working people today.

22. Doorey, supra note 11 at 17.
23. The concern is that collective rights may start being shaped in individualist terms.
24. For a history of the “law of the labour market” approach, as well as a critique of its normative
foundations, see Ruth Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) at chapter 8. For an argument in its favour, see Simon Deakin & Frank
Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at chapter 5.
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In the next section, I use this approach to tell the story of the birth
of modern work law regimes in Canada, with a focus on Ontario, when
they were assembled into their current configuration. I concentrate on
the relationship between the common law of employment, labour law
and collective bargaining, and employment standards legislation. Human
rights law is not covered, because its conceptual logic and role in the
pyramid raise larger questions than can be canvassed in this short piece.25
II. The relationship between the regimes: A brief history of work law
regimes in the Fordist era
The current work law framework was first assembled during the last years
of the Second World War. It was designed around two different concepts
of the employment relationship and three different legal regimes. One
conceptual framework, the common law of employment, was built on
common law principles which envisaged a private relationship based on
individual rights. The other framework, labour law, was conceived as a
collectivist public law endeavour providing workers with voice and dignity
in the workplace. Each framework was primarily built through one legal
regime, but a third work law regime, minimum standards law, also existed
and applied to both the common law and labour law frameworks. In both
cases, the minimum standards statutes created a series of entitlements for
workers that operated to set a floor beneath which the parties could not
contract. In the labour context, minimum standards statutes acted to shift
the balance of power between the parties in collective bargaining. The
minimum standards statutes also affected the balance of power between
lower-income, non-unionized employees and their employers, but often
acted less as a springboard for negotiation, and more as the main source
of their employment terms and their workplace rights. The result is that,
as the following pages describe, the post-war work law system operated
less as a dual parallel system and more as a hierarchical pyramid, with
the common law at the top of the pyramid, labour law in the middle, and
minimum employment standards statutes at the bottom.
From at least the turn of the 20th century employment was constructed
in Canada as a private contractual relationship between two equal parties,
subject to the common law. The common law of employment had begun
to develop in England in the early 19th century to regulate the work of
higher status employees.26 This developing body of law was theoretically
25. Human rights law is part of the larger research project described above, supra note 12.
26. See Bramwell v Penneck, (1827) 7 B & C 536, 108 Eng Rep 823. For discussion of this case and
issue, see Christopher Frank, Master and Servant Law: Chartists, Trade Unions, Radical Lawyers and
the Magistracy in England, 1840–1865 (Ashgate Publishing, Online Edition, 2010) at 32-36.
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structured around newly emerging laissez-faire ideals of market and
state, constructing the employment relationship as a private contractual
relationship between two parties equal in law, regulated by the general
laws of contract.27 Although this narrative has had remarkable staying
power, it was never particularly accurate. From the early 19th century
the common law courts of England created special rules for employment
contracts that did not apply to other contractual relationships. And more
importantly, the common law absorbed into its content some of the status
and subordinating features of the previous statutory system of master and
servant.28 The result was to build inequality into the heart of the common
27. AV Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during
the Nineteenth Century, 2nd ed (London, 1914) at xxx-xxxii; Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law
(London: John Murray, 1920) at 319; Daphne Simon, “Master and Servant” in John Saville, ed,
Democracy and the Labour Movement (London, 1954); RW Rideout, “The Contract of Employment”
(1966) 19:1 Current Leg Probs 111; Otto Kahn-Freund, “Blackstone’s Neglected Child: The Contract
of Employment” (1977) 93 Law Q Rev 508.
28. Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (London: Faber and Faber Limited,
1974) at 182-183; Philip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (USA: Russell Sage Foundation,
1969) at 132. Master and servant law was a class-based statutory system first enacted in the 13th
century to minimize wage competition between employers and ensure them access to an available pool
of workers. The hierarchical nature of master and servant law was enforced through employers’ almost
unfettered right to obedience from their servants, and the use of jail time as sanction for employees
who violated its terms. The master and servant system persisted until 1875, when its penal sanctions
were repealed. The courts absorbed many of its elements into the common law of employment, despite
framing this area as organized around principles of equality before the law. In reality, employers
continued to hold a residual right to manage their businesses as they saw fit. To give life to that right,
the status-based duties servants had owed their employers were now recast as implied legal terms
of employment contracts, terms that arose naturally from the intrinsically hierarchical nature of the
employment relationship. In other words, any negotiations between the parties started from a position
in which the common law had already endowed the employer with rights of control and direction that
could not easily be bargained away. For historical accounts of master and servant law in England, see
Simon Deakin, “The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution”(2001) ESRC Centre for
Business Research Working Paper No 203; Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour
Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Douglas Hay, “Master and Servant in England:
Using the Law in the Eighteenth and Nineteen Centuries” in Willibald Steinmetz, ed, Private Law and
Social Inequality in the Industrial Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) [“Using the Law”];
Douglas Hay, “England, 1562–1875: The Law and Its Uses” in Douglas Hay & Paul Craven, eds,
Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562–1955 (North Carolina: University
of North Carolina Press, 2004); Frank, supra note 26; Brian Napier, The Contract of Service: The
Concept and its Application (PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1975); Daphne Simon,
“Master and Servant” in John Saville, ed, Democracy and the Labour Movement (London 1954);
Robert J Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment Relation in English and American
Law and Culture, 1350–1870 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Robert
J Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Sidney & Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (London, 1911
edition). For a historical account of Canadian colonial experiences with master and servant law, see
Paul Craven, “The Law of Master and Servant in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario” in David Flaherty
ed, Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Grace
Laing Hogg, The Legal Rights of Masters, Mistresses and Domestic Servants in Montreal, 1816-1829
(Masters Thesis, University of Montreal, 1989) [unpublished]; Sean T Cadigan, “Merchant Capital,
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law of employment.29 The Canadian colonies received and/or enacted their
own master and servant statutes when the British first claimed Indigenous
lands as their own.30 The colonial courts thereafter also adopted common
law principles as they developed.31 This latter body of law was still referred
to as “master and servant law,” but now referred to the common law of
employment, rather than its statutory ancestor.
The new Canadian Dominion, still in process of formation, entered the
20th century amid its Second Industrial Revolution, a period characterized
by sustained economic growth, significant immigration, westward
expansion, and the growing dominance of American manufacturing
companies and their newly developing ideas of scientific management.
The early 20th century was also characterized by a major strike wave, as
workers protested the deskilling of the new manufacturing processes.32
In 1900 the federal government began to enact a series of voluntary
processes to address industrial disputes, first through the Conciliation Act
of 1900, then the Railway Labour Disputes Act of 1903, and finally the
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907.33 The voluntary nature of
the statutes’ processes made them generally ineffective, but some of their
characteristics were nonetheless adopted by later labour statutes.34 By
the State, and Labour in a British Colony: Servant-Master Relations and Capital Accumulation in
Newfoundland’s Northeast-Coast Fishery, 1775-1799” (1991) 2:1 Journal of the Canadian Historical
Association 17; Ian C Pilarczyk “Too Well Used by His Master: Judicial Enforcement of Servants’
Rights in Montreal, 1830–1845” (2001) 46:2 McGill LJ 491; Ian Pilarczyk “The Law of Servants
and the Servants of Law: Enforcing Masters’ Rights in Montreal, 1830–1845” (2001) 46:3 McGill LJ
779: Paul Craven, “Canada 1670–1935, Symbolic and Instrumental Enforcement in Loyalist North
America” in Douglas Hay & Paul Craven, eds, Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and
the Empire, 1562–1955 (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). For a history the
early common law of employment, see Steinfeld, ibid; Mark Freedland, The Contract of Employment
(London: Oxford University Press, 1976); Mummé, supra note 3; Claire Mummé, “From Control
Through Command to Control of Discretion: Labour Time, Labour Property and the Tools of
Managerial Control in early 20th Century Ontario” (2016) 45:2 Indus LJ 176.
29. Fox, supra note 28; Selznick supra note 28; Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London:
Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1972) at 12-13 [Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law].
30. Different colonies “received” English law at different moments in time, and with different
specifications. See Bora Laskin, The British Tradition in Canadian Law (London: Stevens & Sons,
1969).
31. See Mummé, supra note 3 at Table 1.
32. Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, “Law, Industrial Relations and the State: Pluralism or Fragmentation?:
The Twentieth Century Employment Law Regime in Canada” (2000) 46 Labour/Le Travail 251; Craig
Heron, ed, The Labour Revolt, 1917–1925 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); Greg Kealey
& Douglas Cruikshank, “Strikes in Canada, 1891–1950” (1987) 20 Labour/Le Travail 85; Bryan D
Palmer, The Working Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800–1991, 2nd
ed (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1992) at 170-176.
33. The Conciliation Act, 1900, SC 1900, c 24; Railway Labour Disputes Acts, SC 1903, c 55;
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, SC 1907, c 20.
34. See Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective
Action in Canada, 1900–1948 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) at chapters 2 and 3 for a
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that time Canadian trade unions, along with their British and American
counterparts, had experienced the criminalization of trade union
activities,35 the unequal penalties for master and servant law violations
by workers and employers,36 and the judiciary’s unwillingness to account
for the material realities of unequal bargaining power at common law.37
In combination, these experiences revealed the common law to be a law
of economic and political subordination.38 Unions and workers responded
with a surge of labour activism in the 1920s, which slowed down during
the Great Depression.39 During the 1930s some Canadian jurisdictions
enacted statutes that opened the way for the labour relations acts of the
postwar era. Quebec enacted the Collective Agreement Decrees Act, which
allowed certain parts of a collective agreement to be extended across an
industry where it was supported by a large number of its members.40
Ontario, and other common law provinces, passed an Industrial Standards
Act, which created tripartite boards of governmental employer and
employee representatives who were to negotiate agreements concerning
wages and working conditions for particular industries in specified
geographical zones.41 Woods and Ostry argue that these statutes serve to
legitimize the political role of trade unions and “laid the framework for a
system of industrial relations which combined collective bargaining with
state regulation.”42 A massive strike wave in the 1940s finally forced the
Canadian federal government to enact comprehensive labour relations
regulation.43 It did so in the form of PC 1003, through which the federal
government introduced an industrial relations model premised on the
American Wagner Act of the 1930s. The new labour law system was
history of these regimes [Fudge & Tucker, Labour Before the Law].
35. See Paul Craven, “Workers’ Conspiracies in Toronto, 1854–72” (1984) 14 Labour/Le Travail
49; and Eric Tucker, “‘That Indefinite Area of Toleration’: Criminal Conspiracy and Trade Unions in
Ontario, 1837–77” (1991) 27 Labour/Le Travail 15 [“Toleration”] for a debate on the legality of trade
union combinations in early colonial Ontario.
36. See Hay, “Using the Law,” supra note 28.
37. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, supra note 29.
38. See Fudge & Tucker, Labour Before the Law, supra note 34 at chapter 2.
39. Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History, 3rd ed (Toronto: James Lorimer
& Co, 2012) at chapter 2.
40. Québec, An Act Respecting Collective Agreement Decrees, CQLR c D-2.
41. In Ontario, see The Industrial Standards Act, 1935, SO 1935, c 28. The Ontario statute was
enacted particularly to address issues in the textile industries. See Mercedes Steedman, “Canada’s
New Deal in the Needle Trades: Legislating Wages and Hours of Work in the 1930s”(1998) 53:3
Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations 535; Marcus Klee, “Fighting the Sweatshop in Depression
Ontario: Capital, Labour and the Industrial Standards Act” (2000) 45 Labour/Le travail 13.
42. Horace Woods & Sylvia Ostry, Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada (Toronto:
Macmillan of Canada, 1962) at 22-23, quoted in Mercedes Steedman, supra note 41.
43. Heron, supra note 39 at 75-78; Peter S McInnes, Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the
Postwar Settlement in Canada, 1943–1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at chapter 5.
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designed around a specific form of employment that came to represent
the norm of male, white and blue-collar employment in the Fordist era
referred to as the Standard Employment Relationship (SER). Fudge and
Vosko explain that:
The SER is best characterized as a continuous, full-time employment
relationship where the worker has one employer … Its essential elements
include an indeterminate employment contract, adequate social benefits
that complete the social wage, the existence of a single employer,
reasonable hours and employment frequently, but not necessarily, in a
unionized sector.44

It became, they explain “the normative model of (male) employment in
Canada,” the paradigmatic employment relationship around which postwar work law was formed.45
This new labour relations system was to represent a post-war
compromise between capital, labour and the state. At its heart was the
following exchange: employers were now statutorily required to recognize
trade unions and to bargain in good faith, while unions agreed to limit the
strike tool for use only in support of collective bargaining at designated
intervals. And it turned the principles of the common law on their head. As
opposed to a contract negotiated by two equal parties, statutory labour law
built a system of collective, rather than individual rights, to be enforced
by industrial relations specialists rather than the common law courts. It
recognized the structural inequality of bargaining power between workers
and employers. And it framed the regulation of work as a question of
public policy, not private law.46 In doing so labour law created a second

framework for the legal regulation of employment.

This second collective framework was not intended to apply to
managerial and professional employees, who were typically excluded
from the coverage of the labour relations acts.47 This group of workers,
44. Judy Fudge & Leah Vosko, “Gender, Segmentation and the Standard Employment Relationship
in Canadian Labour Law, Legislation and Policy” (2001) 22:2 Economic and Industrial Democracy
271 at 273.
45. Ibid at 274.
46. The post-war system of industrial legality also served to forge what Fudge and Tucker have
called a system of “responsible unionism”: Fudge & Tucker, Labour Before the Law, supra note 34.
Although in the short-term unions benefitted from the post-war compromise, it also provided the state
with the tools to dictate acceptable union behaviour and disincentivize worker militancy. The result
was to narrow the focus of trade union attention from general social activism to enterprise-based
bargaining geared towards wages and benefits. See Tucker, “Toleration,” supra note 35 at 53-54;
Leo Panitch & Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms
(Garamond Press, 1988).
47. The occupational classification system used by Statistics Canada at the time defined “managerial”
to include owners operating or managing their own business and paid managers, except in agriculture,

Unifying the Field: Mapping the Relationship Between
Work Law Regimes in Ontario, Then and Now

557

therefore, remained employed under individual employment contracts
regulated by the common law. Owing to their status and professional
training, many such workers held a reasonable degree of bargaining power
with their employers and were able to negotiate some of the terms of their
employment contracts. In some instances, the existence of a unionized
workforce might provide a net economic benefit to white-collar employees,
insofar as their entitlements would be pegged to exceed that of blue-collar
workers. Women accounted for almost half of employees in the professional
fields, but typically earned half of their male counterpoints’ income and
thus had less bargaining power.48 In general, the employment contracts of
workers in this category operated within the common law framework of
background contractual rules and implied terms, supplemented by a mix
of material terms bargained between the parties and unilaterally imposed
by the employer. Disputes over the interpretation and implementation
of the terms of employment contracts could theoretically be resolved by
litigation to the civil courts. But despite the superior bargaining power of
these workers compared to others, few employment contract claims were
litigated in Ontario until the 1960s.49 This suggests that even the most
powerful of non-unionized employees were not able to access the law to
enforce their employment contracts while remaining on the job.
Once a workplace was unionized, its workers were no longer regulated
by the common law. Rather, unionized employees were now regulated by
the collectivist framework of labour law and collective bargaining. In the
decades after the Second World War, the unions’ membership grew steadily
in manufacturing, the resource sector, and the transportation industry,
resulting in the growth of a blue-collar middle-class.50 In mid-century
forestry and fishing. “Professional occupation” included workers who “perform tasks which usually
require training in a specific scientific or other professional field, at a university, technical institute or
similar establishment or which require creating ability in literature or art.” Included in the professional
category were architects, engineers, nurses, judges and magistrates, lawyers, physicians, but also
artists and art teachers, librarians, teachers, etc. Noah M Meltz, Manpower in Canada 1931–1961
Historical Statistics of the Canadian Labour Force (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1968) at 27.
48. Women made up almost half of all employees in professional employment. Most professional
women earned at the mid-range of wage scale, closer to men engaged in manual work, but received
significantly less than their male counterparts in the same professions. For instance, in 1951 male
nurses made an average annual wage of $2205.00, while female nurses made $1724.00. In 1961,
male teachers in the same year made $5527.00, while female teachers made an average of $3397.00.
Meltz, supra note 47 at 242 (Table B1). See also Sylvia Ostry, The Occupational Composition of the
Canadian Labour Force (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1967 at 76-79). Racebased data was not kept at this time, nor were other types of social markers typically recorded, other
than age, but given the demographics of the country and the common discriminatory beliefs, we can
assume that most workers in this category were white.
49. Mummé, supra note 3.
50. Heron, supra note 39 at chapter 2.
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Canada, that blue-collar workforce was primarily composed of white male
employees. Between the mid-1940s and the 1960s, collective bargaining
provided unionized workers with career-long employment, internal job
ladders for promotions, loyalty-incentive benefits such as private pensions
and extended medical coverage, and of course, a family wage capable of
supporting a married couple with children.51
Another body of law also applied to unionized workers—minimum
standards legislation.52 In the early 20th century Canadian governments
had enacted minimum wage and maximum hours of work statutes for
women.53 Some jurisdictions also enacted fair wage statutes and policies
that provided a living wage to government contractors (primarily men).54
These statutes operated within the common law framework by imposing
minimum and maximum terms into employment contracts, in other words
creating a zone of permissible contract entitlements for those subject to
the legislation. Before the mid-century, trade unionists often portrayed
legislated employment standards as dangerous to their interests, appropriate
only for the work of women owing to their special vulnerability.55 But
51. Katherine VW Stone, “Policing Employment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contract Firm”
(1993) 43:3 UTLJ 353 at 363-369.
52. The concept of minimum standards was developed by the International Labour Organization
(ILO) early in its existence, although the terminology itself was not used until the 1930s. The first
recorded use I have located is by US Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins in Record of Proceedings,
International Labour Conference, Twenty-Sixth Session, Philadelphia, 1944 (Montreal: ILO) at 23.
Conceptualizing minimum terms as a “floor of rights” was the innovation of Lord Wedderburn, who
first used the term in his 1972 edition of The Worker and the Law. See KW Wedderburn, The Worker
and the Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971) at 16.
53. See eg, the Manitoba Minimum Wage Act, SM 1918, c 38; Saskatchewan’s The Public Works Act,
SS 1916, c 9; and British Columbia’s Male Minimum Wage Act, SBC 1925, c 32. Typically a board or
commission was created, which often set minimum wages for women on an industry by industry basis.
Rates were also sometimes differentiated by age or experience. Enforcement was an ongoing problem
and in Ontario at least, the Department of Labour typically refused to prosecute for ongoing violations.
See JW MacMillan, “Minimum Wage Legislation in Canada and Its Economic Effects” (1924) 9:4
Intl Labour Rev 507; Margaret E McCallum, “Keeping Women in their Place: The Minimum Wage in
Canada 1910-25” (1986) 17 Labour/Le travail 29; Gillian Creese, “Sexual Equality and the Minimum
Wage in British Columbia” (1991) 26:4 Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d’Études Canadiennes
120.
54. See Bob Russell, “A Fair or a Minimum Wage? Women Workers, the State, and the Origins of
Wage Regulation in Western Canada” (1991) 28 Labour/Le travail 59 for a fascinating analysis of the
differences between “minimum wages” for women, and “fair wages” for men.
55. They worried that it created a dependence on the state rather than their own economic power,
and that the standards set could become maxima rather than minima and create a ceiling instead
of a floor. See, eg, “Minimum Wage for Women,” The Voice, Winnipeg, (9 May 1913) at 3. Many
unions nonetheless supported a legislated minimum wage for women, owing to their perceived
vulnerability. Edith Lorentsen & Evelyn Woolner, “Fifty Years of Labour Legislation in Canada”
in Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette L:9 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1950) 1412 at
1423. On the relationship between women’s minimum wage and the labour movement, see Jane
Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family (Toronto: The
Women’s Press, 1992) at 77-80; Gillian Creese, “Sexual Equality and the Minimum Wage in British
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increasing support for legislated work standards emerged in the 1930s and
1940s. In the 1940s and 1950s Canadian governments began to extend
minimum wage and hours of work regulation to men, and to enact newer
minimum employment standards, such as vacations with pay and antidiscrimination legislation.56 In the late 1950s, and throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, Canadian jurisdictions began to amalgamate the separate
statutes into single consolidated acts, typically referred to as labour or
employment standards legislation (ESA).57
Minimum standards statutes had two lives in the post-war era. In
Ontario managerial and professional employees were excluded from
most of the ESA’s coverage,58 but the statutes did apply to both individual
employment contracts and to collective bargaining agreements. In the
labour context, the ESA operated to set and/or increase the starting point
for bargaining.59 If an agreement was silent on an issue that was statutorily
regulated, the statutory minimum would be read into the collective
agreement. In the next round of bargaining, the union could then argue to
increase it or could structure the give and take of negotiations around other
priorities. The impact of minimum standards on collective bargaining was
well illustrated by employers’ reactions to the inclusion of an employee
Columbia” (1991) 26:4 J Can Studies 120 at 121-125; Veronica Strong-Boag, “The Girl of the New
Day: Canadian Working Women in the 1920s” (1979) 4 Labour/ Le Travail 131 at 148-164.
56. British Columbia was the first province to enact a minimum wage statute for men in 1925: Male
Minimum Wage Act, SBC 1925, c32. Between the 1940s and 1960s many other provinces did the
same. For example, Minimum Wage Act, 1945, SNB 1945, c 42; Minimum Wage for Men Act, SPEI
1960, c 27; Hours of Work and Vacations with Pay, SO 1944, c 26; The Annual Holidays Act, 1944,
SS 1944, c 65; An Act to Promote Fair Employment Practices, SO 1951, c 24; The Fair Employment
Practices Act, SM 1953, c 18.
57. Minimum Employment Standards Act, SNB 1964, c 8; Canada Labour (Standards) Code Part
III, SC 1964–1965, c 38, The Employment Standards Act, 1968, SO 1968, c 35 [ON ESA]; The Labour
Standards Act, 1969, SS 1969, c 24. In Ontario the first ESA amalgamated the Hours of Work and
Vacations Act, the 1963 Minimum Wage Act that applied to men and women, and the Factory Act, and
amended the Ontario Human Rights Code to transfer equal pay protections to the ESA. The Act for
the first time provided employees with a right to refuse overtime work and raised the minimum wage
level from $1.00 to $1.25 per hour. The content of the Act was not met with significant trade union
support, who were particularly upset by the ongoing availability of employer permits to be exempted
from hours of work regulations. Mark Thomas, Regulating Flexibility: The Political Economy of
Employment Standards (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009) at 68.
58. ON ESA, supra note 57, s 7(2); Employment Standards Act Regulations, OReg 366/68, s 2-3 [ON
ESA Regs].
59. See eg, Letter from DS Keen, Manager of the Ontario Division of the Canadian Manufacturers’
Association, to Minister of Labour Dalton Bales (2 August 1968) Minister of Labour Correspondence,
Toronto, Archives of Ontario (7-1-0-1408.2 Box 38446) at 7; Letter from DA Michum, Vice-President
of the Algoma Steel Corporation, to Minister of Labour Dalton Bales, (21 June 1968) Minister of
Labour’s General Correspondence and Subject Files, Toronto, Archives of Ontario (7-1-0-1407.2 box
B388446); Letter from Peter Ribotto, Vice-President of Caland Ore Company, to Minister of Labour
Dalton Bales (17 July 1968) Minister of Labour’s General Correspondence and Subject Files, Toronto,
Archives of Ontario (7-1-0-1407.2 box B388446).
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right to refuse overtime in Ontario’s 1968 ESA. Before the ESA created
this new right, employers held the residual right to require employees
to work overtime, arising from their managerial prerogative. They
understood the new right to significantly change the balance of power
between the parties. D Lord, President of the Ontario Mining Association,
opined to then Minister of Labour Dalton Bales that the new employee
right to refuse overtime “effectively grants to unions a perennial demand
which many employers have not conceded.”60 The statute gave the unions
something they would usually have to fight for, and in doing so changed
the toolbox of benefits that could be traded off between the parties. At a
general level, therefore, the employment contracts of unionized workers
were populated by terms collectively bargained, and in some cases, read
in from employment standards legislation. Disputes over the interpretation
and/or implementation of the collective agreement was resolved by labour
arbitrators, thus providing unionized workers with a method of addressing
workplace issues while remaining in employment.
Minimum standards legislation also applied to non-unionized, nonmanagerial and non-professional employees.61 When labour law was
enacted it was expected that it would provide for all non-managerial nonprofessional workers, but over the post-war decade it became increasingly
clear that there were numerous people left out of its gains. The segmented
nature of the post-war labour force was no accident. Jane Ursel explains
that the job stability, wage protections, pensions and additional benefits of
the male unionized employees in core industries required the availability
of labour in the secondary sectors, where product demand was unstable and
fluctuating, requiring a temporary workforce with little to no job security
or benefits.62 Some workers in the peripheral sectors were white male
“[b]lue collar workers in small-scale industry [who] continued to eke out
a living at wages far below those in the unionized sector and with far less
job security.”63 Some were Indigenous, Black and immigrant men working
in smaller enterprises. But most were women: white, Black, Indigenous
60. Letter from D Lord, President of the Ontario Mining Association, to Minister of Labour Dalton
Bales, (5 July 1968) Minister of Labour Correspondence, Toronto, Archives of Ontario, (7-1-0-1408.2
Box 38446) at 2.
61. In Ontario, as in many other provinces, managerial and professional employees were excluded
from the coverage of minimum standards statutes: see sources supra note 58.
62. In the 1970s Piore and Doeringer argued that the labour market was segmented in two, a primary
and secondary sector (“dual labour market” theory). The primary sector was characterized by stable
employment in large corporations organized around internal job ladders, offering strong job security.
The secondary sector consisted of low-waged low-skilled jobs lacking job permanence or consistent
hours. See Michael J Piore & Peter B Doeringer, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis
(New York: ME Sharpe Inc, 1971) at 164-181.
63. Heron, supra note 39 at 83.
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Women of Colour and immigrant women, earning at or below minimum
wage, often working part time in smaller enterprises.64 Entrenched in the
SER was the idea that women would receive the benefits of collective
bargaining not as workers, but through their husband’s family wage.
Women were expected to work only a few years before marriage and to
thereafter return to the home and take care of the children. Indeed, in the
aftermath of the Second World War, it was explicit government policy to
push women out of the jobs they had taken up during the war and convince
them to go back to the work of the home, freeing up jobs for the returning
male soldiers.65 Minimum standards law was the primary legal regime
regulating these workers.
Starting in the 1960s the government of Ontario began to recognize
that not all workers enjoyed the benefits of the post-war Golden Age.66
The ESA, and particularly its minimum wage, was understood as a tool
for poverty reduction and market planning. In a draft backgrounder to
Cabinet by Ontario’s Minister of Labour in 1968, the Minister explained
that “the minimum wage remains one of the most important instruments
in the Province’s efforts to prevent the economic exploitation of our
human resources.”67 Its principal purpose, he explained, was to prevent
exploitation:
[It] ensure[s] that employees with little or no bargaining power are paid
hourly rates that give them sufficient income to obtain the necessities
of life. In this context a minimum wage is intended to prevent severe
exploitation in both the social and economic meanings of that word;
to serve as pressure upwards toward the elimination of unfair wage
competition, and to support money incomes and demand in periods of
economic slack. It is a floor beneath which wages cannot legally fall.68

64. Ursel, supra note 55 at 239-241
65. Ann Porter, “Women and Income Security in the Post-War Period: The Case of Unemployment
Insurance, 1945–1962” (1993) 31 Labour/Le Travail 111 at 114; Ruth Roach Pierson & Marjorie
Cohen, “Educating Women for Work: Government Training Programs for Women before, during,
and after World War II” in Michael S Cross & Gregory S Kealey, eds, Modern Canada 1930–1980’s:
Readings in Canadian Social History, vol 5 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1984) at 223-228.
66. Ontario Department of Labour, Labour Standards and Poverty in Ontario (22 November 1965)
at 6-7; Legislation Affecting Women’s Work, Labour Gazette, Department of Labour, 29 July 1967 at
672-672. Ontario Ministry of Labour officials noted that in 1963, approximately 6.5% of workers in
non-agricultural and salary workers earned less than $1.00 per hour, of which two-thirds were women.
The majority of people working for less $1.00 per hour were employed in the services and retail small
establishments. The Case for a $1.25 Minimum Wage, Minister of Labour’s General Correspondence
and Subject Files, Toronto, Archives of Ontario (7-1-0-1407.1 Box B388446).
67. Labour Standards Act 1968 Background Memorandum (25 January 1968) Correspondence with
the Deputy Minister of Labour, Toronto, Archives of Ontario, (RG 7-12-0-3431 box 354049).
68. Ibid.
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At the same time, the standards were not intended to reshape the
relationship between capital and labour. Rather, they were to operate only
to “fix a starting point after which the forces of the market place [sic] can
begin to take effect.”69
For more precarious workers, therefore, the minimum standards
statutes were the main source of rights and many of their contract terms.70
The common law created the framework for their employment contracts,
organized around the implied employee terms and the managerial
prerogative, but the terms of their contracts were a combination of terms
unilaterally imposed by the employer on non-statutory matters, and
minimum standards read into their contracts. In other words, for lowerwaged non-unionized workers, minimum standards legislation did not so
much increase the baseline for bargaining, but rather served to populate
the content of their employment contracts. And because the minimum
standards statutes also built rights enforcement mechanisms outside the
civil courts, they ended up providing the main site for rights enforcement
for lower-waged workers.
Although theoretically intended for employees with low bargaining
power, the Ontario ESA excluded some of the most vulnerable workers
in the province. Women employed in domestic service, who, in the postwar era were almost exclusively Black and Indigenous women, often
experienced significant inequality of bargaining power but were not
extended the benefits of the ESA.71 Several portions of the ESA were
also not afforded to many agricultural workers who, starting in the 1970s,
were increasingly workers from Latin American and Caribbean countries
imported through state-run seasonal temporary labour programs.72
69. The Case for a $1.25 Minimum Wage, Minister of Labour’s General Correspondence and
Subject Files, Toronto, Archives of Ontario (7-1-0-1407.1 box 38446).
70. These workers were entitled, in theory, to common law remedies for wrongful dismissal but the
cost of a bringing a civil claim, and the common law’s predisposition towards higher status workers,
made the common law an unlikely source of remedies for lower income workers.
71. ON ESA Regs, supra note 58, s 1(f). During the Second World War most women were able to
move into fields other than domestic service, due to labour shortages. After the war, however, some
white women were able to remain in those occupations, while Indigenous, Black, Women of Colour
and other new immigrants were pushed backed into domestic work. See Dionne Brand, “‘We Weren’t
Able to Go into the Factories Until Hitler Started the War’: The 1920s to the 1940s” in Peggy Bristow,
ed, We’re Rooted Here and They Can’t Pull Us Up: Essays in African Canadian Women’s History
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 180-181; Linda Carty, “African-Canadian Women
and the State: Labour Only Please” in Peggy Bristow, ed, We’re Rooted Here and They Can’t Pull
Us Up: Essays in African Canadian Women’s History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994)
at 212-215; Adele Perry, On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia,
1849–1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001); Mary Jane Logan McCallum, Indigenous Women,
Work, and History: 1940–1980 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2014) at chapter 1.
72. See eg ON ESO Regs, supra note 58, s 3; The Employment Standards Act, 1957 SMB c 20, s
2(h)(ii); The Alberta Labour Act, 1973, SA 1973, c 33, s 2(d). For a history of temporary agricultural
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As the above story tells us, the practice of dividing work law between
labour and employment law first occurred when statutory labour was born
in Canada. Labour law was the new law of industrial democracy, while
employment law was the old law of master and servant, the purview of
highly-paid managerial employees. While employment standards applied
to both unionized and non-unionized employment contracts, over time
it was placed within the sphere of employment law because it was most
directly significant to lower-income non-unionized workers.
The actual picture of post-war work law was, of course, a lot more
complicated than this. The Fordist era constructed two conceptual
frameworks for regulating waged work, the contractual common law
framework for non-unionized workers, and the collectivist framework of
labour law. Employment standards operated within both frameworks. But
minimum standards also operated as the primary regime regulating lowerwaged work. Thus rather than two parallel systems, the post-war work law
system operated as a hierarchical pyramid, with each layer representing
a particular legal regime regulating a particular class of worker. At the
top of the pyramid was the common law of employment, which primarily
regulated high-income managerial and professional white male employees.
The terms of their employment contracts were a mix of negotiated terms
and terms unilaterally imposed by the employer, all operating within the
common law framework of background rules and implied obligations. The
content of their entitlements was typically above the minimums set by
statute. At the second, and largest, level of the pyramid was labour law
and collective bargaining, regulating the work of white male blue-collar
unionized employees. The employment contracts for these workers were
derived through collective bargaining with the employer, as shaped by
employment standards’ floor of rights. At the third level of the pyramid
was minimum standards legislation, which operated within a common
law framework but provided direct entitlements and rights to those with
the least bargaining power. Each of these legal regimes interacted with
one another, but also apportioned different rights and remedies to workers
along with class, race and gender lines. It worked something like this:

labour programs in Canada, see Vic Satzewich, Racism and the Incorporation of Foreign Labour:
Farm Labour Migration to Canada since 1945 (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).
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Figure 1: Mid-20th Century Work Law Pyramid

III. The current operation of the Canadian work law system
Since the 1980s global trade policies and communication technologies
have eased the ability to move capital and production across the globe.
Many countries of the Global South have increased their manufacturing
capacities, while countries of the Global North have shifted towards
the services, financial, and in Canada, resource sectors. Transnational
production and consumption have increased global competition,
decreasing companies’ ability to predict demand for their product, thus
placing downward pressure on wages. Businesses have responded by
outsourcing, domestically and abroad, shedding employment relationships
in favour of buying from others so as to flexibilize their production and
staffing practices.73 As a result, many companies no longer maintain a
full complement of permanent employees, but rather staff up and down
depending on immediate production needs. In combination, these factors
have led to the rise of non-standard employment—work which typically
does not possess central features of the Fordist SER.74 Swayed by
recessionary pressures and neoliberal ideas of governance and efficiency,
governments have also adopted downsizing practices, outsourcing and
selling off public institutions and services, eliminating government support
programs, implementing wage freezes in the public service, and starving
adjudicative tribunals and enforcement agencies of funding.75
73. David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be
Done to Improve It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014) at chapter 1.
74. Ibid.
75. See Bryan M Evans & Carlos Fanelli, eds, The Public Sector in an Age of Austerity: Perspectives
from Canada’s Provinces and Territories (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018); Tribunal Watch
Ontario, Statement of Concern about Tribunals in Ontario (shared on twitter by Wade Poziomka on 20
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Occupational distribution has changed significantly in the postFordist era, as has Canada’s population. In 1961, 47.1% of the Canadian
workforce was employed in goods-producing occupations, but by 2019
manufacturing accounted for only approximately 20% of the Canadian
workforce.76 79% of the Canadian workforce is currently employed in the
service sector.77 The Canadian population has also changed considerably.
The Canadian population is ageing, due to the advancing years of the baby
boomer generation, and workers are remaining in employment for longer
periods of time.78 Immigration is the primary source of population growth
in Canada, diversifying the ethnic and racial makeup of the population,
accompanied by significant growth in the Indigenous birth rate.79 Women
now account for almost half the number of workers in Canada, and dualincome families are the norm rather than the exception.80
Unionization levels have dropped consistently since the 1980s. The
rate of unionization reached its all-time high in 1984 in Canada at 34%
and now hovers around 30%.81 Currently, the majority of the unionized
May 2020), online: <https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/63407869/tribunal-watch-ontariostatement-of-concern> [https://perma.cc/J77Z-MLXP].
76. The 2012 North American Industry Classification System used by Statistics Canada in the
Labour Force Survey defines the “goods-producing” sector to include the agricultural, utilities, and
manufacturing sectors. A different classification system was used for the 1961 census, so the figure
of 47.1% was derived from adding together the equivalent classifications from the 1961 census data
analyzed by Sylvia Ostry in The Occupational Composition of the Canadian Labour Force (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1967) Table 2 at 50; Statistics Canada, Labour force
characteristics by industry, annual, Table: 14-10-0023-01 (formerly CANSIM 282-0008) (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 2019), online: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=141000230>
[https://perma.cc/R277-9A5L] [Labour Force Characteristics].
77. Labour Force Characteristics, supra note 76.
78. Statistics Canada, Canadian Demographics at a Glance, 2nd ed, by Demography Division,
Catalogue No 91-003-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 19 February 2016), online (pdf): <https://
www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/91-003-x/91-003-x2014001-eng.pdf?st=ND0ZXUSt>
[https://
perma.cc/T9AQ-NW9U]. 17.2% of Canadians are 65 and older, and people are remaining in the
workforce for an increasing amount of time. Census data from 2016 indicates that 36% of the Canadian
workforce was 55 years of age and over. In 1990 this segment of the population accounted for 25% of
the workforce.
79. Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population, Catalogue No 98-400-X2016190 (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 8 February 2017), online: <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/> [https://perma.cc/QG9V2NHB]. The main source of population growth in Canada is immigration. In 2011 Canada 20% of the
population was composed of people not born in Canada. The population of Canada has diversified in
race, ethnic origin and religion. In 1981 4.7% of the population classified themselves as being visible
minorities in the Census. Currently 22.3% reported being of the population are of colour, which is
projected to reach 34.4% of the population by 2036. The Indigenous communities have the highest
growth rate in Canada, with a 42.5% increase since 2006.
80. Statistics Canada, The Rise of the Dual-Earner Family with Children, in Canadian Megatrends,
Catalogue No 11-630-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 30 May 2016), online: <https://www150.statcan.
gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2016005-eng.htm> [https://perma.cc/492F-28BP].
81. Statistics Canada, Union Status by Industry, Table 14-10-0132-01 (formerly CANSIM
282-0223) (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2020), online: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/
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workforce is in the public sector. Sixteen per cent of employees in the
private sector are unionized, compared to 75.8% in the public sector. If
the typical union member of the post-war era was a white male in bluecollar manufacturing employment, it is now a female employee working
in the public sector. The public sector jobs are primarily held by women
employed in nursing, teaching, and civil service positions, while the smaller
number of unionized private sector employees are men working in what
remains of manufacturing employment, utilities, and some construction
work.82 The centre of post-war public policy lay in the second layer of the
Fordist work law pyramid, regulated by collective bargaining, while the
core of the Canadian labour market is now comprised of non-unionized
service sector employment regulated by the common law and employment
standards.
The economic shifts have combined to create a growing trend towards
job misclassification,83 short-term, casual, fixed-term and part-time
employment. The majority of the workforce remains in full-time permanent
employment, but the majority of new jobs created are in the service sector
and bear the markers of insecurity, as demonstrated by the COVID-19
pandemic.84 “Compared with the 1980s, proportionately fewer…jobs are
now full-time (i.e. without a specific end date), unionized, or covered by a
registered pension plan (RPP) or a defined benefit RPP.”85 The number of
men in permanent full-time positions in 1989 was 87.7%, dropping down
to 80.8% in 2018. The number of women in full-time permanent positions
in 1989 was 70.6% and remained relatively stable in 2018 at 69.5%. In
the last census of 2016, the average annual income of Canadians was
$46 057.00, and the median annual income was $33 683.00.86 The majority
tv.action?pid=1410013201> [https://perma.cc/4H2E-MZP4].
82. Statistics Canada, Union Status by Occupation (x 1,000), Table 14-10-0319-01, online: <https://
www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410031901> [https://perma.cc/6B6Z-HZU2].
83. Job misclassification occurs where an employer classifies a worker as an independent contractor
to avoid the obligations of labour and employment law that apply only to employees and dependent
contractors.
84. Statistics Canada, Assessing Job Quality in Canada: A Multidimensional Approach, by Wen-Hao
Chen & Tahsin Mehdi, in Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, Catalogue No 11F0019M
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 10 December 2018), online (pdf): <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/
pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2018412-eng.pdf?st=x1K0cKzF> [https://perma.cc/LLA3-JNHR].
85. Statistics Canada, Changing Characteristics of Canadian Jobs, 1981 to 2018, by René
Morissette, in Economic Insights, Catalogue No 11-626-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 30 November
2018) at 1, online (pdf): <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/11-626-x/11-626-x2018086-eng.
pdf?st=7ZiGlbn_> [https://perma.cc/L6CR-QGZF].
86. Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population, Catalogue No 98-400-X2016304 (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 8 February 2017), online: <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/
dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?TABID=1&LANG=E&A=R&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&F
REE=0&GC=01&GL=-1&GID=1325190&GK=1&GRP=1&O=D&PID=110698&PRID=10&PTYP
E=109445&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2017&THEME=124&VID=0&VNAMEE=&
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of Canadians are clustered around the lower end of the wage distribution,
earning at or close to minimum wage.87 There is a significant gap between
the richest and poorest in Canada, a continued income gap between women
and men, and racialized and white Canadians.88 If the labour market
paradigm of the post-war era was the Standard Employment Relationship,
the paradigm of the early 21st century is the low-waged precarious worker.
The shifting nature of political ideologies, market structures and
production processes have not left the laws of work unchanged. In the
1980s and 1990s, governments withdrew their support for labour law and
collective bargaining as a central part of labour force policies, in favour
of so-called deregulation, efficiencies and individual rights approaches.
Private law values re-emerged as the preferred framework for the
development of work-related rights. Still, Canadian governments have
tended not to eliminate labour and employment laws wholesale. Instead,
they simply fail to update the regimes to meet the changing nature of work
and production, choosing to leave emerging problems to the economic
power of the parties.89
In the post-Fordist era, therefore, there has been a decoupling of
wages, job and wage stability from occupational types. This means that
workers within any given occupation may have very different working
conditions and may be regulated by different legal regimes.90 In the postwar era, the laws of work operated in a hierarchical, pyramidal form
because each layer more or less corresponded with occupational categories
and wage classes. Occupation and wage class served as a marker of job
and income stability, and of the primary legal regime regulating the work.
This alignment no longer holds. While there is still a relationship between
wages and job permanence, they are no longer directly correlated to one
another, as job insecurity now permeates all wage classes.91 Because
VNAMEF=&D1=0&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0&D6=0> [https://perma.cc/V23K-SZHW].
87. Prior to 2018 the minimum wage in Ontario was $11.60, which would provide a full-time
employee working a 40-hour week an income of approximately $23 700.00 per year. The current
minimum wage rate is $14.00 per hour, providing an annual income of $31 200.00 per year.
88. Ibid; Sheila Block, Grace-Edward Galabuzi & Ricardo Tranjan, “Canada’s Colour Coded
Income Inequality” (December 2019) at 5, online (pdf): Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives,
<https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/canadas-colour-coded-income-inequality>
[https://perma.cc/94EY-8RKL].
89. Canadian governments have also made internal alterations to key legal principles within the
statutes so as to readjust the balance of power between workers and employers. Often, after one
government is elected it makes changes to the labour relations and employment standards act, which
are promptly unmade by the next government.
90. Chen & Mehdi, supra note 84 at 13.
91. Trish Hennessy & Ricardo Tranjan, “No Safe Harbour: Precarious Work and Economic
Insecurity Among Skilled Professionals in Canada” (2018), online (pdf): Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives <https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20
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work law regimes have generally not been updated, there are now people
who are regulated by legal regimes that do not match their income levels
and degrees of precarity. The three work law regimes no longer relate to
one another like a pyramid. What we have now is an income hierarchy,
a precarity distribution, and legal regime flow chart. In other words, the
degree of labour market segmentation is increasing. We therefore cannot
use occupation to speculate on the origin of contract terms or to determine
their primary applicable legal regime. Instead, we need more granular
information about differences within occupations to determine the origins
of workers’ contractual terms, so as to locate what legal regimes regulate
their work.

Figure 2. 21st Century Wage and Work Law Regime

The above graph demonstrates that the common law is currently the
primary regulatory regime for managerial and professional employees
who are not highly paid. This is because managerial and professional
employment no longer necessarily provides a high wage or job security.
For instance, while some lawyers, some pharmacists and physiotherapists
have highly-paid secure jobs, some also work in situations of precarity.
And because managerial and professional employees remain excluded
from all or parts of the ESA, these workers can have little in the way
of bargaining power or available legal remedies unless unionized.92 The
Office%2C%20Ontario%20Office/2018/08/No%20Safe%20Harbour.pdf> [https://perma.cc/4YB368U7].
92. In Ontario, regulated professions, including architects, lawyers, professional engineers, public
accountants, surveyors, veterinarians, chiropodists, chiropractors, dentists, massage therapists,
medical doctors, optometrists, pharmacists, physiotherapists and psychologists are exempted from
the ESA’s protections regarding hours of work and eating periods, the three hour rule, overtime pay,
minimum wage, public holidays, and vacations with pay. See OReg 285/01, s 2.
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terms of their employment contracts therefore originate from negotiation
with the employer, where possible, or employer imposition on a take-itor-leave-it basis.
Also now regulated by the common law are low-waged precarious
workers who have been misclassified as independent contractors, and so
are also excluded from the coverage of the ESAs and of the common law
of employment. These workers are treated as own-account entrepreneurs
and regulated by the general law of contract, but because of their low
bargaining power, they will not be able to bargain with their “employers.”
For this reason, their contracts may include terms below the minima, or
simply not provide any entitlement to basic standards such as lunch breaks,
vacation time, etc. The prime example of this type of work is gig work.93
Regardless of income, it is not clear that there are any legal avenues
at common law to resolve employment disputes during the life of the
contract through law. Many workers will fear that any discussion of legal
rights will result in their termination. And at a more technical level, some
courts have held that bringing a civil claim against one’s employer while
in employment constitutes a repudiation of the employment contract.94
Common law employment rights mostly exist in the breach, enforceable
only upon the end of the relationship. But for at least a portion of employees
regulated at common law, the cost of bringing an employment-related
claim to the common law courts is simply unaffordable, such that they
arguably have no recourse to work law at all.
As noted, the majority of Canadian workers are currently employed
in non-unionized service sector employment. Some of this work provides
for a mid-level wage and decent job permanence, while some is highly
precarious. The employment contracts for this part of the labour force
appear to contain a mix of terms provided by the employer above minimum
standards, and terms that are at the minimum level read in from statute. In
essence, the majority of the Canadian workforce appears to be regulated
93. A recent Statistics Canada study suggests that there are two distinct classes of gig economy
workers: a group of professional employees who are able to earn a decent to high income through
gig work, and a group of workers with less educational background who earn in the two lowest
quintiles of the income distribution. Many are paid on a piece-rate basis, incentivizing longer hours
and faster work practices, without the protections of occupational health and safety legislation and
the limitations (such as they are) on hours of work placed by employment standards. See Statistics
Canada, Measuring the Gig Economy in Canada Using Administrative Data, by Sung-Hee Jeon,
Huju Liu & Yuri Ostrovsky, in Analytical Studies Brach Research Paper Series, (16 December 2019),
online: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2019025-eng.htm>; Glyn Jones,
“Gig Economy Posing New Safety Risks,” Canadian Occupational Safety, (6 January 2020), online:
<https://www.thesafetymag.com/ca/news/opinion/gig-economy-posing-new-safety-risks/193318>
[https://perma.cc/E9NC-S437].
94. See eg Suleman supra note 20.
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by a hybrid legal regime which imbricates the common law, contractual
terms, and employment standards. And there is much we do not know
about how this hybrid regime functions.95
The following questions would help elucidate how this hybrid regime
operates. Are there some ESA terms that operate effectively as a ceiling,
because employers simply do not provide above what is required by statute?
For instance, do employers provide paid holiday days in addition to those
listed by statute, or has the statutory minimum effectively also become
the maximum? Second, we need further information about the nature and
effect of the mix of statutory and contractual terms. Are there occupational
differences in the extent or choice of terms that employers leave to
employment standards? How do employers choose what to provide over
the minimum and what to leave to the statute? Does the percentage mix of
contractual versus statutory terms act to direct an employee towards one
legal regime for enforcement? Is it a matter of the particular terms that were
breached, or the accessibility of the regimes, or a combination of both?
Employment standards terms are typically enforceable in administrative
venues, in addition to the civil courts. Do middle-income earners actually
make use of the claims process at the Ministry of Labour, or is it primarily
utilized by low-income workers? In other words, is there an income level
at which people stop using the employment standards claim process?
Is there an income level that correlates with employment contracts that
possess all terms above the minimum or all terms at the minimum? Given
that common law and employment standards rights are difficult to enforce
during an employment relationship, what impact does the law have on
employer behaviour? Do small and medium size employers know their
employment law obligations? Do they make decisions in function of that
law? These are important questions because the majority of employers in
Canada are small-sized companies.96
We also need further research on the accessibility of the civil courts
for parties seeking to adjudicate employment-related claims. This issue is
relevant not only to those regulated by the hybrid regime, but also those
regulated only by the common law and contractual terms, some of whom
do not have extensive financial means. The content of the common law
of employment has historically provided greater rights and remedies to
higher status workers, particularly as regards damages for wrongful

95. I hope to answer some of these questions in the larger research project, see supra note 12.
96. Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Key Small Business Statistics
(January 2019), online (pdf): <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/vwapj/KSBS-PSRPE_Jan_2019_
eng.pdf/$file/KSBS-PSRPE_Jan_2019_eng.pdf> [https://perma.cc/79GW-PE2D].
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dismissal.97 The historical view was that it was harder for higher status
workers to find alternative employment once dismissed because there were
fewer jobs of a similar class. Whether or not this was historically accurate,
it is clear that it does not represent current labour market realities. The
courts have been inching their way towards eliminating the importance
of employment status in determining the length of reasonable notice.98
And appellate level decisions over the last twenty years have attempted
to attenuate the inequality of the common law’s apportionment of rights
and responsibilities. The question is whether these substantive decisions
can help workers if the cost of bringing a claim remains high. First, we
need to know how much it costs to bring a standard wrongful dismissal
claim. The Canadian Lawyer’s annual Legal Fees Survey reports a cost of
approximately $7,500 to $10,000 as the average national cost of retaining
a lawyer to litigate an unspecified employment contract claim.99 If the
average annual income of Canadians at the last census was $46,057.00,
and the median annual income was $33,683.00, an employment-related
claim would cost approximately a quarter or a third of a person’s annual
income.100 But there is more to learn here. For instance, how much does
an employee need to earn to be able to afford a lawyer to represent them
in a wrongful dismissal claim? How does this differ across the country?
How many lawyers provide limited retainer services for employment
matters, and what are the associated costs? How many lawyers provide
contingency fee retainers? What size damage award must be likely for a
lawyer to take a claim on contingency? How does this change by locality?
Previous empirical research has found that length of tenure has the biggest
impact on determining the length of a reasonable notice award.101 Can we
use the reasonable notice factors to determine who does not possess the
97. See eg Carey v F Drexel Co Ltd, [1974] 4 WWR 492 at 12, [1974] BCJ No 604 (BC SC).
98. The historical relevance of social class to determining the length of reasonable notice was made
explicit in the 1908 Alberta decision of Speakman v City of Calgary (1908), 1 Alta LR 454, 9 WLR 264
(CA). There is now a steady move towards reducing the significance of “character of employment”
to assessing the reasonable notice award, but it has not disappeared altogether. The current approach
appears to be that employment status is of declining significance and should not be used to reduce
the length of notice of lower status positions. See Di Tomaso v Crown Metal Packaging Canada LP,
2011 ONCA 469; Michela v St Thomas of Villanova Catholic School, 2015 ONCA 801; Bramble v
Medis Health and Pharmaceutical Services, [1999] NBJ No 307, 175 DLR (4th) 385 (NBCA), but
may be used to increase the length of notice of employees in higher status positions. See Love v Acuity
Investment Management Inc, 2011 ONCA 130.
99. Marg Bruineman, “Steady Optimism – 2019 Legal Fees Survey” (April 2019), online (pdf):
Canadian Lawyer <https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/staticcontent/AttachedDocs/CL_Apr_19survey.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2R93-5U7Q].
100. Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population, Catalogue No 98-400-X2016304 (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 8 February 2017).
101. See supra note 98.
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characteristics necessary to be able to access a civil wrongful dismissal
claim? What percentage of cases are appealed, and which of the parties
appeal most frequently? Parties to wrongful dismissal claims are subject to
cost awards. What impact do cost awards have on an employee’s decision
about whether to appeal a decision against them? What is the cost impact
of a wrongful dismissal claim on a small business owner? Employees
in Ontario can bring wrongful dismissal claims requesting less than
$35 000.00 damages to Small Claims Court, while the rest proceed to
Superior Court. What percentage are filed in each court? Are the parties
typically represented by counsel, and does this differ by court level? Are
there useful models of expedited processes for wrongful dismissal claims
from around the country from which we could learn?102
In the post-war era women were the largest occupants of irregular,
insecure, and low-wage jobs. Work with these characteristics has expanded
in the post-Fordist era and now makes up a much larger percentage of
the labour force.103 Noack and Vosko found in 2011 that single parents,
racialized workers, recent immigrants and workers with a high school
diploma or less are more likely to be in involuntary part-time employment
than other members of the workforce, and part-time temporary jobs had
the highest degree of precarity.104 They also found that the accommodation,
food services and agriculture industries offered the most precarious jobs,
a finding that was replicated in the 2016 Census.105 Employees in the food
and beverage industries and retail tended to be women working part time
with terminal high school diplomas.106 Racialized and recent immigrant
women tend to be overrepresented in the retail sector.107 Resource
extraction jobs also provide precarious work, primarily employing men in
seasonal employment in areas such as forestry, primary resource extraction
and some agricultural work.108

102. In Ontario there is a Simplified Process for claims for less than $100,00.00 at the Superior Court,
which is often used for wrongful dismissal claims. Also, Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
allows for wrongful dismissal claims to be heard by way of summary judgment where there is “no
genuine issue requiring a trial.” Ontario summary judgment proceedings appear to have increased
over the last years, particularly since Ontario courts have indicated approval for its use in wrongful
dismissal claims. Has this process reduced costs for the parties, and if so, by how much? What are the
strengths and weaknesses of the process? What similar innovations exist in other provinces?
103. Fudge & Vosko, supra note 44 at 290.
104. Andrea Noack & Leah Vosko, Precarious Jobs in Ontario: Mapping Dimensions of Labour
Market Insecurity by Workers’ Social Location and Context, for the Law Commission of Ontario’s
study on Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Work (November 2011) at 18-21.
105. Ibid at 24.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid at 26.
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Just as in the post-war era, the employment contracts of these workers
operate within a common law framework. The terms of their contracts
primarily arise from statutory minimum terms, with the rest determined
by the managerial prerogative and employer-imposed terms on issues
for which the acts are silent. The rights and remedies available to these
employees mostly come from the ESA. Although this group of workers
is also entitled to reasonable notice of dismissal at common law, the cost
of enforcing that right puts it out of reach for the overwhelming majority
of workers in this category. What is more, as noted above, the common
law principles determining the length of reasonable notice award longer
notice periods to workers with long job tenures and arguably higher status
workers.109 As such, both the content and the cost of the common law
make its rights illusory for low-waged workers.
Many workers are theoretically covered by the ESA, but because
their work no longer holds SER characteristics, many may not in practice
qualify for their entitlements. For instance, workers employed on multiple
temporary contracts may not accrue sufficient job tenure to qualify for a
vacation, or for a right to termination pay.110 Moreover, since the ESA was
first enacted, a large number of exemptions have been added to exclude
different types of workers and certain industries from some or all of its
coverage. As Vosko, Noack and Thomas recently concluded, women
and Indigenous workers suffer a greater impact from the combination of
exemptions and gaps in coverage than other workers.111 As mentioned
earlier, Canadian governments have by and large chosen not to update
the statutes to include provisions addressing newer labour market issues,
nor have they addressed the holes in coverage created by the increase in
flexibilized work arrangements. And, many of the minimum standards
have barely changed in content since they were first created. In Ontario,
there has been only one increase in the length of termination pay since the
ESA was first enacted in 1968.112 There have been relatively few changes
109. Supra note 98.
110. At common law the courts will consider an employee on multiple successive fixed term contracts
as an employee. See Ceccol v Ontario Gymnastics, [2001] OJ No 3488, 55 OR (3d) 614. The question
is who can afford to access this right.
111. Leah Vosko, Andrea Noack & Mark Thomas, How Far Does the Employment Standards Act,
2000, Extend and What are the Gaps in Coverage? An empirical analysis of archival and statistical
data, Research Project Prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Labour to support the Changing
Workplaces Review of 2015 (Ontario: Queen’s Printer, 2016) at 63-73.
112. Notice of termination was included in the Ontario ESA in 1970: Act to Amend the Employment
Standards Act, 1968, SO 1970, c 45, s 6(b). From 1970 to 1987 an employee who worked for at
least three months was entitled to one week’s notice if employed for two years or less, two weeks if
employed between two and five years, four weeks if employed between five and ten years, and eight
weeks’ notice if employment for more than ten years. The current notice entitlement was enacted in
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to the vacation provisions since 1944.113 And, although there have been
modifications over the years, the current maximum hours of work are the
same amount as in the 1970s.114 Provincial minimum wages have sorely
lagged behind living wage levels, and increasing it has been the main focus
of activist pressure regarding precarious work over the last few years.115
New standards have been added to the statutes over the years, but they
change little in content once included.
Research by Leah Vosko, Mary Gellatly and others demonstrate that
enforcement of employment standards is a real problem. Proactive spot
workplace inspections are chronically underfunded, although they are the
best method of ensuring employer compliance with the requirements of the
statute. In the absence of proactive inspections, ESA rights enforcement
occurs mainly in the breach, because it is left to individual employees
to bring claims to the relevant authorities. Although they can, in theory,
bring claims while on the job, precarious workers might rightfully worry
about their job security if they were to do so. Most claims are for unpaid
wages, vacation pay, and termination pay. In the 2000s in Ontario, a large
number of leaves were added to the Employment Standards Act, but it
appears as though these provisions are almost entirely unlitigated outside
the unionized context.116
1987 in An Act to Amend the Employment Standards Act 1968, SO 1987, c 30.
113. In the first 1944 act employees were entitled to one week’s paid vacation. The Hours of Work
and Vacation with Pay Act, 1944, SO 1944, c 26, s 2(b). In 1966 the Act was amended to provide
one week’s paid vacation for each of the first three years of employment, and two weeks after an
employee had completed thirty-six months of employment. See An Act to Amend the Hours of Work
and Vacations with Pay Act, SO 1966, c 67, s 1(2). In 1970 the Act was amended to provide two weeks’
vacation available after 12 months of work. See an Act to Amend the Employment Standards Act
1968, SO 1970, c 45, s 7. This provision remained in place until 2018, when section 3 was amended
to provide three weeks of vacation for employees who have been employed for 5 years or more.
Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41, s 33.
114. The Hours of Work and Vacation with Pay Act, 1944, SO 1944, c 26, s 2(1) established a
maximum workday of 8 hours and a work week of 48 hours. The Employment Standards Act of 1968
imposed an obligation on employers to pay an overtime rate of time and a half for work after 48 hours,
where the employer held a permit to permit for a longer work week. The current provisions were
adopted in 1973. See An Act to Amend the Employment Standards Act, SO 1973, c 172, s 3.
115. Canadian activists have tended to focus their organizing activities on a few key employment
standards that have immediate tangible impact on workers, such as raising the minimum wage,
regulating scheduling, providing paid sick days, and on improving the enforcement of the acts. $15
and Fairness Campaigns have grown across the provinces throughout the 2010s. See Workers’ Action
Centre, Still Working on the Edge, Submission to the Changing Workplace Review (March 2015),
online (pdf): <https://workersactioncentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/StillWorkingOnTheEdgeWorkersActionCentre.pdf> [https://perma.cc/6T7H-AEPD]; Employment and Social Development
Canada, What We Heard: Modernizing Federal Labour Standards (30 August 2018), ss 2.2-2.3, online
(pdf):
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/canada/employment-social-development/campaigns/
labour-standards/1548-MLS_WWH-Report_EN.pdf> [https://perma.cc/J22E-QPFP].
116. An informal search of “employment standards act” + “Ontario” + “leaves of absence” returns
a list of cases by relevance, the first 20 of which were brought by unionized workers adjudicated at
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In Ontario, a worker can bring a claim to the Ministry of Labour, which
is investigated by an Employment Standards Officer (ESO), who then
issues a first instance decision. Either party may ask for a reconsideration
and/or appeal to the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB). There are
approximately 15,000 complaints made to the Ministry of Labour annually,
70% of which are assessed by an ESO.117 ESO decisions are not decisions
of record. They are not publicly available and, for anyone other than the
parties, a Freedom of Information request (FOI) must be filed to obtain
any of the decisions. Approximately 8% of ESO decisions are appealed
annually to the OLRB, the majority of which are requested by employers.118
Of the 8% appealed, 77% are settled by the parties before a decision by the
Board.119 OLRB cases that proceed to a final decision represent the body of
reported employment standards decisions available in Ontario. Based on
these numbers, only a tiny fraction of cases decided under this statute are
publicly available, such that ESO decisions are made effectively without
public and legal scrutiny. Consider this situation: a study by Vosko, Noack
and Tucker disclosed a particularly low success rate for certain types of
violations, including claims regarding reprisals, claims regarding hours
of work, minimum wage, severance, overtime, temporary agency rules,
and leaves of absence. They posit that these standards may not be well
understood by claimants or are difficult to prove to ESOs’ satisfaction.
But there is no way to further investigate the issue without making an FOI
request to receive all cases in which these claims were raised. We know
little of what evidence ESOs require to demonstrate a breach for different
claims, about what case law they use—if any, etc, beyond what is reported
by workers and lawyers from claims in which they are involved. There is
no obvious reason why ESO decisions should not be considered decisions
of record.120 And given that legislators have chosen not to update the
arbitration, rather than from non-unionized employees.
117. Vosko, Noack & Tucker, Employment Standards Enforcement: a Scan of Employment Standards
Complaints and Workplace Inspections and Their Resolution Under the Employment Standards
Act, 2000, Research Project Prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Labour to support the Changing
Workplaces Review of 2015 (Ontario: Queen’s Printer, 2016) at 20, 28.
118. 62% of applications for review are made by employers (ibid at 62).
119. Ibid at 63.
120. ESO decisions are not considered adjudicative, despite the discretion they hold to determine
evidentiary requirements and interpret statutory provisions. Section 3(1) of the Statutory Powers
Procedures Act, RSO 1990, c S22 states that its requirements, including the obligation to provide
written reasons, only apply to administrative decision-makers who are obliged to hold a hearing to
determine the outcome of a claim.. ESOs, however, are not required to hold a hearing in exercising
their powers under the Act. In 2019 the Ontario government enacted the new Tribunal Adjudicative
Records Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 7, Schedule 60, which requires that certain tribunal records be made
available. It applies to tribunals listed in the Schedule of Act. But the Ministry of Labour is not on that
list, and the Act does not define “adjudicative.” As such, decisions under the Employment Standards
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content of employment standards as work relationships change, the veil of
secrecy over this body of law makes it impossible for lawyers to develop
its content, such that it has become an essentially ossified area of law.
Finally, Vosko, Noack and Tucker found that between 2009–2010
and 2014–2015, only 39% of monetary orders were fully paid. 6% were
partially satisfied, and 60% were not paid at all.121 Put together, these
facts paint a grim picture of the Ontario employment standards regime.
The statutory regime that is intended to provide for the least powerful
workers has barely been updated in terms of substantive entitlement since
it was enacted in 1968. It has not been modified to address emerging
labour market issues, leaving many groups of precarious workers without
protection. It is developed in secrecy, away from public and legal scrutiny
and is therefore difficult for lawyers to challenge and develop in content.
And, finally, if an employee does receive an order of money owing, there
is only a 40% chance they will receive what they are owed. These are not
the characteristics of a successful legal regime.
What, then, of the operation of labour law and collective bargaining in
the post-Fordist era? As noted above, the composition of union members
has changed significantly since the 1980s. Since 2006 most unionized
workers in Canada are women, the majority of whom work in the public
sector, but there are also unionized workers in some male-dominated
occupations such as in the utilities, construction and manufacturing sector
work. The wage rates of unionized workers include some quite highearning white-collar unions, but most are clustered at the mid-point of
the wage distribution.122 The tendency of Canadian governments not to
update labour legislation has had a tremendous impact on unionization
rates in the private sector. The post-war labour relations system was built
on employment in mass-producing manufacturing enterprises with large
workforces. The Wagner Model enterprise-based bargaining system was
viable in that context because each bargaining unit was of sufficient size
to hold some bargaining leverage. But the rise of outsourcing has reduced
the size of employing entities, such that the majority of Canadians are now
employed in small and medium-sized enterprises. Smaller units in large
companies represent a fraction of the employer’s profits, and smaller units
employed by smaller companies tend to be goods and service suppliers
whose profit, production, and employment processes are directly or

Act continue to be subject to privacy legislation, and its decisions are not publicly available.
121. Vosko, Noack & Tucker supra note 117 at 70.
122. Statistics Canada, 2016 Census, Catalogue Number 98-400-X2016304, online: <https://
www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/98-400-X2016304> [https://perma.cc/QQ96-ZZHN].
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indirectly controlled by their larger clients. In other words, the Wagner
Model has made it difficult to organize amongst the most precarious
sectors, such as in retail, restaurant and gig economy work.
The terms of unionized employees’ employment contracts continue
to be the product of collective bargaining, as in the post-war period.
Unionized jobs continue to offer higher wages than non-unionized jobs,
although the extent of the wage premium appears to have declined through
the 2000s.123 Unionized workers are also more likely to receive private
pension plans and other benefit programs.124 Labour arbitration, the
adjudicative forum for interpreting and applying collective agreements,
has become more legalistic, however. Hearings now cost more and take
longer, the evidence requirements have increased, and the parties are now
more likely to be represented by lawyers.125 Still, compared to rest of the
Canadian workforce, unionized members continue to be able to participate
in the process of bargaining the terms of their employment contracts, and
are able, by way of their union, to ensure that the terms of the collective
agreement are applied while employees are on the job.
There are some interesting questions about the current relationship
between collective bargaining and employment standards that are worthy
of further study. The first is whether bargaining units in some industries are
actually able to bargain above the employment standards minimum. Data
on whether some unions have been stuck with the statutory minimums,
in what industries, and regarding which terms would help evaluate the
current relationship between collective bargaining and minimum standards
legislation. There is also the sense that some employment standards are
litigated almost exclusively in the unionized context, such as layoffs and
leaves. Research on whether this is correct and why it is so would be useful
to understand what types of legal rights are effectively enforceable only in
the unionized context.
Finally, the entire premise of the SER, male family-wage earning
blue-collar private sector work, has been inverted. Unionized jobs are
predominantly public sector employment and staffed by women. Yet
private sector labour laws continue to dominate academic research in the
field, if not public debate on unions. Serious debate about the impact of
123. See Tim Bartkiw’s summary of recent literature on the topic of wage premiums in Canada:
Bartkiw, Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lockouts under the Labour Relations Act, 1995, prepared
for the Ontario Ministry of Labour, to support the Changing Workplaces Review of 2015 (Ontario:
Queen’s Printer, 2015) at 8-11.
124. Noack & Vosko, supra note 104 at 12-14.
125. Bruce J Curran, “Event History Analysis of Grievance Arbitration in Ontario: Labour Justice
Delayed?” (2017) 72:4 Relations Industrielles/ Industrial Relations 621.
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the feminization of labour law needs to occur, so as to learn about: how
this shift impacts the conceptual framework of labour law; how it changes
the assumptions held about unionized work; how it affects governmental
responses to public sector work disputes, both as legislator and employer,
etc. This is a broad and important topic for the future of labour law
development in Canada.
Conclusion
In 1981 Brian Langille shone a spotlight on the growth of non-standard
work and argued that the field’s division had to be abandoned for the
legal regulation of precarious work to become central to labour lawyers’
work. Langille suggested that we move from separated fields to one single
field that took as its general concern the legal regulation of all forms of
waged employment. Over these last pages, I have offered one way into
the project of broadening the field, which is to focus the analysis on the
relationship between work law regimes, and on the role their relationships
play in structuring contracts of employment. Investigating the points of
overlap, of disjuncture, and of gaps between the regimes, probing the
boundaries and norms of differing conceptual frameworks, all serve to
elucidate how labour market divisions are created and perpetuated by law.
This is of paramount importance at this juncture in time, because change
is the main characteristic of the post-Fordist era. Policymakers, academics
and workers advocates have spent the last 40 years scrambling to simply
keep up with ever-changing work arrangements and production methods.
It is hard to see what is happening on the ground, let alone study it. In the
context of ongoing work transformation, the choice to tinker at the margins
of work law reform, to maintain a system designed 80 years ago, is itself
a cause of labour market fragmentation. But focusing on the relationship
between the regimes may help us identify the places and spaces where law
is implicated in the ever-increasing segmentation of the labour force.
The picture painted here suggests that we have one legal regime—
the common law—which affords few material terms and substantive
rights, provides no mechanism to ensure its rights are enforced and is not
affordable for a significant portion of the population. We have a second legal
regime—collective bargaining—which remains strong in content and can
be used to ensure employment terms are followed while in employment,
but is difficult to access for the majority of workers who need it. We have
a last legal regime—employment standards—which cannot easily be used
while in employment, operates in the shadows beyond public scrutiny and
will not often provide a remedy even if one is legally owed. And in between
these regimes are workers left out of all coverage, work arrangements that
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do not allow employees to qualify for rights because they were designed
around Fordist norms of work, and workers regulated by regimes apposite
to the extent of their bargaining power. If we had heeded Langille’s call in
the 1980s, amongst other things, we might not now have to face the reality
that many Canadians enjoy no effective workplace rights at all.
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